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The Lost Deportations and the Lost People 
of  Kunmadaras: A Pogrom in Hungary, 1946
The subject of  this article is one of  the scandals of  postwar Hungarian politics and 
society: the anti-Semitic pogrom that took place on May 21, 1946 in the village of  
Kunmadaras. The Kunmadaras riot was part of  a series of  anti-Jewish atrocities 
that broke out in the summer of  1946 in the Hungarian countryside. These events, 
however, were comparable with similar violence against surviving and returning Jewish 
communities in East Central Europe, particularly in Poland and Slovakia. The scholarly 
literature so far has typically understood these events as the outcome of  social discontent 
raised by economic hardships and mismanaged or openly abused and even generated 
by political ideologies, particularly Nazism and Communism. These descriptions 
rarely problematize the Jews as an obvious ethnic category and seldom ask questions 
concerning the ways peasant or local communities actually distanced their neighbors 
as “Jews” to be beaten. This article focuses on the everyday interaction through which 
ethnicity and ethnic identities were constructed in a village that, as the outcome of  the 
events, was split between “Hungarians” and “Jews” in the summer of  1946. While taking 
the political implications into consideration, I argue that the pogrom was a consequence 
of  the frames of  traditional peasant culture, which were mobilized under the particular 
postwar social and political circumstances, and particularly of  the culture of  collective 
violence that was also present in the village of  Kunmadaras. The second section of  the 
article, however, concentrates on how politics abused the events during a subsequent 
trial and constructed a particular Hungarian version of  the anti-Fascist myth without 
the Jewish victims themselves. As was the case all over Soviet-dominated East Central 
Europe, this myth built a certain level of  legitimacy for Communist parties.
Keywords: Anti-Semitism, collective violence, Communism, popular culture, memory 
of  World War II
Introduction
On May 21, 1946 a riot against the Jews of  the Hungarian village of  Kunmadaras 
broke out. Several people were beaten and eventually three of  them were killed. 
The Kunmadaras revolt was one in a series of  horrifi c assaults against surviving 
Jewish communities in postwar East Central Europe, particularly in Poland, 
Hungary and Slovakia. Attempts by historians to interpret these controversial 
events regularly generate fi erce debates, such as the recent debate concerning 
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the 1946 Kielce pogrom in Poland or a debate in the mid-1990s about the 
postwar beatings of  Jews in the Hungarian countryside. For many historians 
the pogroms are explained by social and economic circumstances, in particular 
the general privation and widespread social discontent that accompanied 
it, which was abused by various malicious political ideologies for their own 
purposes.1 Apparently, such cases prove the survival of  prewar fascist and Nazi 
racist propaganda and serve as ex post facto evidence for the complicity of  
local societies in the deportation of  Jews initiated and coordinated by German 
authorities.2 Other historians argue that while the impact of  Nazi anti-Semitism 
was relevant, postwar domestic Communist parties played a more instrumental 
role in the pogroms, as they manipulated and abused anti-Semitic sentiments 
to legitimize their own dictatorial attempts.3 A third position, on the contrary, 
calls into question the notion that the atrocities were motivated by political 
anti-Semitism and, in fact, rejects anti-Semitism as a motif  in general, links the 
violence instead to ordinary acts of  banditry and robbery.4
Strangely, despite their disagreements on other points, both the interpretation 
based on the impact of  political ideologies and framed as a history of  political 
ideas and the alternative one focusing on allegedly non-political social mentalities 
lead to a rather embarrassing conclusion. The idea that peasants were either 
1  Bożena Szaynok, Pogrom Żydów w Kielcach. 4. VII 1946 r. (Warsaw: Bellona, 1992); Łukasz Kamiński 
and Jan Żaryn, eds., Refl ections on the Kielce Pogrom (Warsaw: IPN, 2006); Éva Standeisky, “Antiszemita 
megmozdulások Magyarországon a koalíciós időszakban,” Századok 126 (1992): 284–308; Éva Vörös, 
“Kunmadaras. Újabb adatok a pogrom történetéhez,” Múlt és Jövő 5, no. 4 (1994): 69–80; Mária Palasik, 
A jogállam megteremtésének kísérlete és kudarca Magyarországon 1944–1949 (Budapest: Napvilág, 2000). (These 
statements can be recognized in the basic study on the postwar situation of  the Hungarian Jews: Viktor 
Karády, “Szociológiai kísérlet a magyar zsidóság 1945 és 1956 közötti helyzetének elemzésére,” in Zsidóság 
az 1945 utáni Magyarországon, ed. Viktor Karády et al. (Paris: Magyar Füzetek, 1984), 37–180; László Ötvös, 
“A madarasi antiszemita megmozdulás,” Jászkunság 36 (February 1990): 81–93. Interpretations based on 
socio-economic reasons were regular in studies on anti-Semitism by social historians of  the 1970s. See for 
instance: Philippe Wolff, “The 1391 Pogrom in Spain. Social Crisis or not?,” Past & Present 50 (February 
1971): 4–18; Angus MacKay, “Popular Movements and Pogroms in Fifteenth-Century Castile,” Past & 
Present 55 (May 1972): 33–67.
2  Jan Tomasz Gross, Fear: Anti-Semitism in Poland After Auschwitz (New York: Random House, 2006); Ján 
Stanislav, “The Anti-Jewish Reprisals in Slovakia from September 1944 to April 1945,” in The Tragedy of  
Slovak Jews, ed. Desider Tóth (Banská Bystrica: Datei, for the Ministry of  Culture of  the Slovak Republic, 
1992), 205–46.
3  János Pelle, Az utolsó vérvádak (Budapest: Pelikán, 1995), 151–68; Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, After the 
Holocaust: Polish-Jewish Confl ict in the Wake of  World War II (Boulder, Col: East European Monographs, 2003).
4  Marek Edelman in Gazeta Wyborcza quoted in Ryan Lucas, “Book on Polish Anti-Semitism Sparks Fury,” 
USA Today, Jan 24, 2008, accessed June 25, 2013, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-01-
24-3040464218_x.htm.
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manipulated by politically conscious organizations, groups or persons, Fascists or 
Communists, or were completely inimical to political ideologies sharply detaches 
the realm of  political ideas from lower-class culture or popular mentalities. From 
this perspective, it seems as if  peasants were invulnerable to violent ideologies, as 
if  they had even resisted them, as if  they were unable to commit racist atrocities 
on their own without the help of  politics. The notion that ordinary people 
commit ordinary violence motivated by material reasons implies this reasoning, 
whereas racist ideological violence is the character of  extraordinary, extremist 
evil political movements, the “Fascists” or “Communists”, who are cast as alien 
to “normal” society. 
A careful reading of  the evidence concerning the Kunmadaras pogrom, 
however, suggests a radically different reading. This essay examines this alternative 
explanation. The atrocities in Kunmadaras, where the villagers systematically 
beat almost all of  their Jewish neighbors, were indeed anti-Semitic. Yet, peasants 
had no need of  political organization or the guidance of  parties: the pogrom was 
the outcome of  an extreme combination of  the peasant understanding of  the 
postwar situation in the context of  traditional popular culture. The beatings of  
Jews were not an inevitable outcome of  the survival of  fascism: the distancing 
of  neighbors as an ethnically distinct other and their exclusion from the village 
community was a gradual process that was fi rmly located in the postwar context 
and happened through the activization of  traditional means of  popular culture.5 
Peasants, having a sophisticated culture, were indeed able to launch pogroms by 
themselves.
Nonetheless, this culture was not separate from political or elite cultures. 
Contemporary politics did have a good deal of  responsibility in the atrocities, 
particularly since villagers read the postwar campaign against the black-marketeers 
as actually justifying their actions. However, what established an even more 
striking relationship among various layers of  popular and elite cultures was the 
memory of  the deportations and the Holocaust, or more precisely, the absence 
of  this memory. In postwar Hungary, as was the case in most European societies, 
the memory of  World War II was dominated by the will to forget, and especially 
to forget the embarrassing memory of  the massive horrors committed against 
Jews. In this context the war appeared as a general tragedy that hit everyone 
similarly, and the suffering of  Jews was not a distinctive historical event: Jews 
5  Carlo Ginzburg, “Killing a Chinese Mandarin: The Moral Implications of  Distance,” Critical Inquiry 21 
(Autumn 1994): 46–60.
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were not special victims of  Nazism. The context of  the deliberately forgotten 
deportations made returning Jewish communities so vulnerable to violence, and 
the atrocities themselves so vulnerable to subsequent political manipulation. It 
was the virtual absence of  Jewish victims from the Communist versions of  the 
anti-Fascist myths that made these myths so attractive to Jews and anti-Semites 
alike. 
The Trial of  the Village Teacher
The Screening Committee, which was responsible for ousting out war criminals 
and fascist persons from public offi ces and decided whether or not someone 
would be put on trial, questioned the political reliability of  the school teacher in 
the village. The Committee argued that the teacher was supporting the political 
measures that were forced on Hungarian society by German fascists.
János Nagy, a local school teacher, as the chief-trainer of  the military 
youth corporation, infected the Hungarian youth for years with the 
controlled ideas of  the pro-German, fascist politics. He himself, 
although he has never been in the army, had the gall to express 
the delight, in front of  a large public, that he took in the German 
occupation, which had to be shared by the whole Hungarian people 
on the celebration of  Heroes Day in spring, 1944. In his blindness he 
made the Jewry the cause of  every problem.6
Following this report of  the Committee, Nagy was brought to justice. He 
was accused of  being a war criminal and was sentenced.
This ruling, however, was not exactly unanimous. Many young people who 
had been taught by Nagy marched into the room where the trial was held and 
demanded that he be released. Several of  them gave confessions in front of  
the court, where, in general, they expressed their doubts that Nagy had been an 
anti-Semite and instead made a case for the general popularity of  the teacher 
in the village.7 The only point of  the indictment, which no one disproved, was 
6  Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok Megyei Levéltár [The County Archives of  Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok], Szolnok 
XVII/418 document 70.
7  Budapest Főváros Levéltára (BFL) [Budapest City Archives], Budapesti Népbíróság, büntetőperes 
iratok, Tóth Zsigmond és társai ellen köztársasági államrendet veszélyeztető cselekmény ügyében, HU BFL 
– XXV.1.a – 1946 – 2351, July 4, 1946. President of  the court: Károly Nagy, Prosecutors: Kálmán Szintay, 
Ervin Zaboreczky. Vizsgálati dosszié [Records of  Investigation], vol. 1, V 56032/1 (Hereafter: BFL V 
56032), 115–17, 133–36, 241–43, 254, 259–62, 298–300.
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that he had given a chauvinistic and militaristic address on May 28, 1944, in 
which he had encouraged the audience to continue fi ghting on the side of  the 
Germans. The speech suffi ced not only to prove to the court that Nagy had 
pro-German sentiments, but also that he should be regarded as a war criminal: 
“With their propaganda, the defendant and others who shared his way of  
thinking infl uenced the Hungarian people not to take in sides with the Allies, 
and this had the consequence that the country was razed to the ground.”8 The 
conclusion that Nagy had been part of  an interwar establishment that had run 
the propaganda was proven not by actual concrete evidence, but by an element 
of  his biography: he was a teacher in the village and as such, in 1929, he 
became a “levente”-trainer, a position in the offi cial youth organization, which 
specialized in patriotic and militaristic education. His accommodation to the 
interwar offi cial infrastructure, however, made him automatically a fascist in 
the postwar context. The support Nagy had from his former students was 
interpreted by the court merely as an indication that “young people who had 
been educated by the accused in the spirit of  fascism” were unashamed to 
show this attitude in public.
Qualifying him as a fascist justifi ed further points of  the indictment, 
although the number of  the confessions that supported either the prosecution 
or the defense was approximately the same. The judge accepted that Nagy had 
disliked the Soviet Union, too. In his speech, Nagy had called his audience’s 
attention to “a horde that had been approaching the borders of  Hungary, and 
Hungary had been obliged to resist.” The court considered the allegations 
regarding Nagy’s anti-Socialist sympathies as well-founded, although there was 
only one witness who supported them. He told the court that the defendant 
had threatened him, saying that “his socialist thinking would come to a bad 
end.” The conclusion that he was an anti-Semite was also logical for the court, 
although it was proven in a very convoluted way. The confession that Nagy 
forbidden his disciples to sing anti-Semitic songs became evidence against him 
according to the logic of  the ruling. The judge argued that the fact that he had 
had occasion to ban the songs was indicative of  the educational atmosphere, 
which had been in his control, meaning that he himself  had once taught the anti-
Semitic songs, which later he had forbidden students to sing. The court was not 
able to submit in evidence any concrete fascist act committed by the teacher—
8  Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára (MOL) [National Archives of  Hungary] 
XX-4-b-348/1945.
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participation in the deportation of  the Jews or in fascist movements—, the 
evidence for his conviction was taken from part of  his biography. The ruling 
was not based on falsifi ed confessions, but the confessions used by the court 
gained their authenticity from the story told about the ”levente”-trainer. One 
part of  his past provided the frame which made it possible for the People’s 
Tribunal to interpret other events of  his life. The peculiar event conceived as 
the starting point of  his story offered causal explanation for his further acts 
as well. The narrative made the fascist real: the life-story of  the teacher was 
presented as the story of  a fascist.9
 The ruling of  the court of  fi rst instance divided the population of  the 
village. For a lot of  them it was not acceptable: Nagy was a respected person of  
the community and they did not regard him as a fascist. Thus, when his second 
trial began on May 20, a signifi cant crowd of  approximately 300 persons on 15-20 
carts accompanied Nagy on his way towards the neighboring settlement, Karcag, 
where the trial was to be held.10 The tension increased when the villagers arrived 
at the border of  Karcag, where they were informed of  the regulation that only 
fi ve persons per party could enter the courtroom. The people of  Kunmadaras 
were dissatisfi ed with this proposal and decided not to go. Furthermore, they did 
not let Nagy participate in his trial, in spite of  the fact that he asked his followers 
to let him go. According to several statements the crowd got angry when they 
tried to enter Karcag, in spite of  the police forces standing on the road. The 
police shot into the air, which further infl amed them. This event persuaded the 
people to return to their village, but they were very disappointed due to the failure 
of  their acts. Remembering the tense situation, several witnesses recollected that 
they had heard Zsigmond Tóth, the fi rst defendant of  the post-pogrom trial 
who was accused of  organizing it, inciting people against the Jews. He claimed 
that the Jews had to be struck dead by any means, since thanks to them the 
people allegedly could not enter the courtroom.11 
9  Jerome Bruner, “The Narrative Construction of  Reality,” Critical Inquiry 18 (Autumn 1991): 1–21. 
According to Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (New York: Vintage Books, 1979) modern jurisdiction 
considers crime as part of  the personality and the outcome of  its past. On biography as evidence cf. István 
Rév, “In Mendacio Veritas,” Representations 35 (Summer 1991): 1–20.
10  BFL V 56032/1, 248, Balázs Berczi, May 23, 1946.
11  Ibid., Ferenc Fodor, May 24, 1946, Elek Kürti, May 25, 1946, Gergely Takács, May 31, 1946, Henrik 
Retzer, May 28, 1946, Ferenc Fodor, June 11, 1946, János Nagy, July 14, 1946, 39, 122–29, 165–68, 215–18, 
254–59, 266, 303–09.
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Campaign against the Black-Marketeers
From the autumn of  1945 until August 1946, the introduction of  the new 
currency, the forint and the issue of  the black-marketeers and speculators 
often appeared in newspapers. The fl y-pitchers were considered enemies of  
the economic recovery and their activity were regarded as the main cause of  
the shortages that endangered the rebuilding of  the country. Mátyás Rákosi, 
secretary general of  the Hungarian Communist Party, laid great emphasis on 
this in his New Year’s article in 1946. He claimed that the available goods had 
to be distributed fi rst and foremost to the industrial workers, as they were the 
most needed in the rebuilding. This important principle was threatened by the 
black-marketeers who made their fortunes primarily through depreciation. 
The existence of   great concentrations of  capital revolted the workers, who 
“undertake the most serious sacrifi ces and privations quietly, if  they see that 
the common bearing of  the burdens is a reality and no one can obtain property 
and lead a life of  luxury off  their misery and privation.”12 Not rarely the articles 
called for the people to take steps against the black-marketeers, for example the 
article of  József  Révai, the main ideologue of  the Communist Party, who stated 
that democracy was based on the consciousness of  the people, but the people 
asked why democracy did not clamp down on the black-marketeers.13 Another 
article argued that the workers not only trust in the authorities, but assist to them 
in order to effect improvements to public supply. It stated that only regulations 
that could be secured by the masses would actually be realized.14 These articles 
emphasized that the measures were on behalf  of  the workers themselves, as 
they served the purpose of  enabling them to get food from the pantries of  the 
wealthy.
An important element in the “campaigns to defend the forint” was the 
boom of  posters and caricatures that depicted the black-marketeers with easily 
recognizable stereotypically Jewish features, for instance before the lynching of  
two Jewish merchants in Miskolc in July, 1946.15 At the end of  the nineteenth 
century Jews were usually depicted with “a thick crooked nose, thick lips, big ears, 
wooly hair, two shabby locks in front of  the ears, a short fat body, short, bandy 
12  Szabad Nép (hereafter: SZN), June 1, 1946: 1.
13  József  Révai,  “Pogrom és népmozgalom,” SZN, June 16, 1946: 1–2.
14  SZN, January 1, 1946.
15  Pelle, Az utolsó, 203. Éva Standeisky, “A kommunista polgárellenesség,” Budapesti Negyed 8 (Summer 
1995): 209–22; Róbert Szabó, A kommunista párt és a zsidóság (Budapest: Windsor, 1995), 71–152. 
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legs, rough hands and most characteristic of  all, a devilish grin conveying greed 
and the desire for possessions.”16 These last features were attributed to them by 
a leafl et that appeared on a communist noticeboard: “However, if  there will be 
persons among them [implying Jews – author’s note] who see the black market 
as a better chance, who want to gamble [...] or enter one of  the parties in order 
to [...] satisfy their greed [...],” the left would protest against this immediately, as 
it had promised.17 
The Historical Anthropology of  Memory
 The Jew-baiting began in the morning at the market square with the beating of  
a Jewish man who had arrived from a neighboring village, Tiszaszentimre. Then 
the crowd chased a Jewish merchant and his family through the streets, while at 
the market the others attacked a person from Budapest. After fi nishing at the 
market the people broke into the shop of  a Jew who lived nearby. Members of  
the Jewish population who were not at the market tried to hide or lock themselves 
up. The crowd went to their houses and assaulted them. Several people were 
beaten and three of  them were killed. One of  the people who was murdered 
originally tried to escape from the village, but the persecutors caught up with 
him near the military airport.18
Villagers were called to account at the end of  May, 1946 at the People’s 
Tribunal. They told their stories about the pogrom under rather special 
circumstances: the place where these accounts were given was a court room and 
the witnesses were speaking during a trial. The reports had a specifi c purpose: 
to defend the people giving them against various charges. They took the form 
of  confessions, which is an act of  memory that seeks to neutralize itself: it aims 
at purifi cation. At fi rst sight, the narratives tried to legitimize at the People’s 
Tribunal the behavior of  their authors, but they provide no explanation for the 
outbreak of  deadly violence. The historian fi nds no reasons in the defendants’ 
stories as to why they assaulted people, nor can one shed light on the motives 
underlying the violence or how the perpetrators gave reasons for the riot. The 
narratives that can be found among the documents of  a trial inform the reader 
16  Péter Hanák, “The Image of  the Germans and the Jews in Nineteenth-Century Hungary,” in Pride and 
Prejudice, ed. László Kontler (Budapest: CEU History Department, 1995), 67–87.
17  Politikatörténeti és Szakszervezeti Levéltár [Archives for Political History and Trade Unions] (hereafter 
PIL), Szociáldemokrata Párt, Főtitkárság, A Főtitkárság levelezése zsidó szervezetekkel, 283. f. 10/212. 70.
18   The most detailed reconstruction is Vörös, “Kunmadaras.”
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merely how the defendants or the villagers tried to tell stories that would sound 
authentic. Consequently, they did not want to legitimize their acts, but rather 
the memory of  an ambiguous occurrence: they wanted to be able to continue 
living live with their memories. Thus the historian can speak about the form of  
memory that the narratives produced, he or she can describe the context in which 
the particular elements of  stories gained meaning and constructed a coherent 
recollection of  the event. Still, the manner in which the villagers told stories 
about the pogrom that sounded authentic sheds light on their ideas regarding a 
“legitimate” riot. Through the micro-historical analysis of  the peasant way of  
thinking an answer can be found to the question of  how the commission of  acts 
of  violence was meaningful for the villagers.19 
What seems to be a remarkably striking feature of  the trial even at fi rst 
sight is that a large number of  the statements claimed that mostly women had 
taken part in the violent acts. The fi rst question that arises is whether there was 
a distinct female interpretation of  the events? Did the women see the pogrom 
differently from the men? Was there a female narrative, a women’s story in 
Kunmadaras, like the story captured by Natalie Davis in her analysis of  pardon 
19  On how narratives were formed in order to win clemency for their authors see: Natalie Zemon Davis, 
Fiction in the Archives (Cambridge: Polity, 1987). On the confession as a form of  memory: Richard Terdiman, 
“The Mnemonics of  Musset’s Confession,” Representations 26 (Spring 1989): 26–48. On the idea that crowd 
violence did not lack a legitimizing notion see esp.: Edward P. Thompson, “The Moral Economy of  the 
English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century,” Past and Present 50 (February 1971): 76–136; Natalie Zemon 
Davis, “The Reasons of  Misrule,” in idem, Society and Culture in Early Modern France (Cambridge: Polity, 
1987), 97–123, “The Rites of  Violence,”  152–87, “Strikes and Salvation at Lyon,” 1–16. Their works 
recently became classic references in historical literature, see Suzanne Desan, “Crowds, Community, and 
Ritual in the Work of  E. P. Thompson and Natalie Davis,” in The New Cultural History, ed. Lynn Hunt 
(Berkeley: University of  California Press, 1989), 47–71. On how interpreting the interpretation of  a violent 
act can serve as a good methodology to decipher cultural systems see: Robert Darnton, “Workers Revolt: 
The Great Cat Massacre of  the Rue Saint-Séverin,” in idem, The Great Cat Massacre (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1985), 75–104. Later the author added nuance to his analysis: “History and Anthropology,”  in The 
Kiss of  Lamourette (New York–London: Norton, 1990), 329–53. Further insights into the micro-historical 
analysis of  collective violence in Edward Muir and Guido Ruggiero, eds., Microhistory and the Lost Peoples of  
Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991). Anthropological studies have turned towards 
explaining the commission of  acts of  extreme violence by examining cultural patterns and notions. See for 
example: Alexander Laban Hilton, “Why Did You Kill? The Cambodian Genocide and the Dark Side of  
Face and Honor,” The Journal of  Asian Studies 57 (February 1998): 93–122. The aspirations to understand the 
motivations of  ordinary people were extended to violence committed as part of  the European Holocaust at 
the end of  the 1990s. Christoper R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution 
in Poland (New York: HarperCollins, 1992); Jan T. Gross, Neighbours: The Destruction of  the Jewish Community in 
Jedwabne, Poland (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
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tales told by women in Early Modern France?20 Can the researcher sort out 
peculiar elements that feature only the “women’s voice”?
There is a place in the memory of  the women that occupies a central position. 
That place is the market. Very few women started their stories with the events 
of  the previous day. For most of  them the morning of  the day at the market 
was the point when the pogrom had begun. A woman was selling turkey when 
she noticed that the merchant was beaten. A third one was going to the market 
when a group caught her eye, and she learned that Klein had been assaulted. 
Most of  the witnesses remembered that women were the ones who participated 
in the pogrom: “all of  them were women and girls, the men were not beating 
anyone, but rather incited the women to hit.”21 What do these statements prove? 
First of  all that usually women went to the market. The market is the place of  
shopping in a village and shopping is considered women’s work. Therefore the 
market was full of  women and not men. In Kunmadaras they participated in 
face-to-face marketing and consequently they were more sensitive to prices, as 
well. The women remembered the acts they had committed on the day of  the 
violent outbreak in the context of  their ordinary activity.
However, was this only a female narrative? The “memory of  women” refers 
not only to what women remember, but also to how they are remembered by 
others. Many of  the male witnesses remembered that the movement had been 
led by a woman named Eszter Kabai Tóth. She was the person who incited 
the people to beat the Jews by shouting, “The Jews have to be hit!” Then she 
personally attacked one of  the fi rst victims, Klein, after having slapped a Jew 
named Weisz a couple of  times in the face.22 Numerous witnesses remembered 
that the victims had been assaulted mainly by women or at least that women 
had initiated the violence. The crowd was led by a couple of  women towards 
the victims, who lived farther from the market square. The witnesses noticed 
the women on every side of  the atrocities: by the house of  Neuländer or 
Kohn.23 The narrative described above was not told only by woman, but also 
about them. Obviously, numerous men also had taken part in the pogrom, as 
one of  the policeman observed: “The whole crowd consisted of  a very mixed 
group, men, women, adults, children, Hungarians, Gypsies, people with various 
20  Davis, Fiction in the Archives, 77–110.
21  BFL V 56032/1, Julianna Andrásy, May 23, 1946.
22  Ibid., 139, 169.
23  Ibid., 240–41; Ferenc Gyarmati, May 23, 1946.
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occupations...”24 However, the presence of  the women was so striking that 
most of  the witnesses felt that they had to talk about it. However, emphasizing 
women’s participation and representing the pogrom as if  it had been mainly a 
women’s issue could lead to further consequences.
For several witnesses the affair at the market was a usual clash between 
sellers and buyers: “On 21 May, on the market day, a quarrel broke out between 
Eszter Kabai and Klein, the egg-merchant who was called Csoli. I do not know 
what it was about exactly, but because of  it Klein was beaten.”25 Some of  them 
were seeing to their everyday tasks at the market. There was a person who wanted 
to buy a pig when he noticed that the crowd was attacking someone. Another 
person went to the square with his fi ancée and was talking with his friend, who 
was a member of  the police, when he saw the people badgering two merchants.26 
For another person, the Jew-baiting was a simple village brawl. He had been 
drinking wine together with his friends in the morning and after having fi nished 
three liters he considered visiting another friend. He happened to walk down the 
same street as the riotous crowd and he began to shout because he was drunk. 
Some defendants told the story as if  it had been one of  the events of  the day, 
one of  many, for instance one of  them said that after the Jew-baiting incident he 
had went home to have lunch, while the other gave reasons for having left the 
pogrom earlier: “According to my master’s instructions I had to go to Karcag, so 
I went home, had lunch, and at about one o’clock I went to Karcag by bicycle.”27
However, some of  the villagers remembered more. Many women gave an 
account of  a quarrel between the women who had arrived to sell or buy in 
the market and the Jewish merchant, Klein. One of  them went to get some 
information about the price of  eggs when she heard Klein saying that he was 
willing to buy eggs for 100 million pengős instead of  the normal 30 million. The 
women protested and suddenly started to hit the merchant.28 His offer was 
understandable for them, since they knew that if  he were to buy all the eggs, they 
would not be able to get any, as one of  them shouted: “Then we cannot live!” 
Another woman told the story as if  all the Jewish merchants had declared that the 
price of  the eggs had been 100 million. The confl ict at the market was presented 
as a struggle between the rich Jewish merchants and the village. According to 
24  BFL V 56032/4, Imre Katona, May 31, 1946.
25  BFL V 56032/1, Imre Csatári, May 29, 1946.
26  BFL V 56032/4, Balázs Berczi, May 23, 1946. 
27  BFL V 56032/1, Balázs Berczi, May 23, 1946.
28  Ibid., 246–47.
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one of  the witnesses, the merchant had claimed that he wanted to devastate all 
Hungarians. The women considered themselves keepers of  the household, and 
this perception was strengthened by the men. In their eyes, the individual clash 
between Klein and “one of  them” represented the social dissatisfaction due to 
the bad living conditions, infl ation and the shortage of  food. A woman said that 
after the Weinbergers were beaten, the sausages and meat that had been found in 
their house had been carried to the police station, since the crowd had demanded 
that this food be taken away because the Jewish family even had a pig. (According 
to the medical report one of  the three murdered victims was strikingly well-fed.) 
One of  the women gave an account of  her participation as follows: she had 
gone to fi nd her husband and when she had recognized him in the crowd she 
was told that the people were beating Klein. She immediately pulled her husband 
from the crowd and sent him home. She presented herself  as the defender of  
the family and the caretaker of  her man. Women referred to the security of  the 
household, thus retelling the story primarily as an issue that affected women 
meant that it would represent the welfare of  the family. The Jewish merchants 
became economic criminals and beating them was transformed into justifi ed 
revenge. For these defendants, the pogrom was not about fascism and anti-
Semitism: their accounts evoked the image of  stalwart defense of  the family 
and acting to facilitate the proper distribution of  food. They had beaten Jews in 
the name of  their “moral economy,” which shaped ideas about the just share of  
economic goods and work in a community. The participants in the market riot 
could understand the posters that appeared on walls all over the country saying, 
for instance, “Women! Against black market, starvation, and shortage of  fuel 
you cannot fi ght alone. The Hungarian Communist Party fi ghts with you, for 
you.” These posters could be interpreted to imply that in the eyes of  the state 
the claims of  the rioters had some legitimacy.29
The quick wealth of  the Jewish population as it was perceived by the 
villagers was absolutely incomprehensible for them. The Jews “returned from 
29  BFL V 56032/1, 92–94, Ferenc Fodorné Erzsébet Barta, May 27, 1946, Julianna Andrásy, May 23, 
1946. Clinical evidence of  Ferenc Kuti, June 23, 1946, V 56032/4, Ferenc Csatári, May 23, 1946; Thompson, 
“The Moral Economy of  the English Crowd.” According to Victoria De Grazia, How Fascism Ruled Women. 
Italy, 1922–1945 (Berkeley–Los Angeles–Oxford: University of  California Press, 1992) the same pattern of  
behavior can be noticed in the last months of  Italian fascism when women started the resistance simply by 
activating traditional family obligations, such as providing food for their children. Women defendants were 
over-represented in postwar trials concerning anti-Semitic acts (38 percent), in contrast to their overall 18 
percent share as defendants in all postwar processes of  People’s Tribunals. Ildikó Barna and Andrea Pető, 
A politikai igazságszolgáltatás a II. világháború utáni Budapesten (Budapest: Gondolat Kiadó, 2012), 61.
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the deportations, and though they assert that nothing remained for them and 
they have nothing, within a couple of  months they had the best things, their 
shops were full, they lived well, seemingly without any work.”30 For the villagers, 
the rational explanation for this phenomenon was that the Jews surely earned 
their money through the black market. The villagers were clear on the existence 
of  the black-market. However, an abstract social category was not recognizable 
for the villagers: the concrete category of  the Jews fi lled it with meaning. In their 
perception, by raising prices the Jews behaved on the market square exactly how 
black marketeers were depicted as behaving.  Every feature that was attributed to 
the speculators found embodiment in the Jews in the perceptions of  the villagers, 
and the consequence of  this was not only were the Jewish merchants considered 
black-marketeers, but their features started to be considered characteristic of  
all Jews. This understanding was confi rmed by popular wisdom about Jews 
and business, Jews and money, as the following common sayings collected in 
Kunmadaras illustrate: “Nor the Jew gives on credit,” meaning only for cash, or 
“Counts like a Jew in an empty shop,” meaning he or she has no income.31
The defendants remembered their personal disappointment that led to their 
violent behavior:
I returned from Russian captivity in October, 1945 and I have been 
employed as a day-laborer, but I cannot afford even to buy a suit. In 
Kunmadaras a lot of  people talked about, I do not remember who they 
were, how the Jews, sure enough, were well off, hardly arriving back 
from the deportations how well they lived by buying and selling on 
the black market and on the side, they did no work, yet they ate white 
bread, had suits made, while we, prisoners of  war, had nothing. Thus, 
a certain antipathy evolved against the Jews, although personally I had 
no troubles with any of  them, but the things I heard produced bad 
feelings in me too.32  
For them, the most signifi cant reason for the outbreak of  the pogrom was 
this perceived social tension. Issues of  basic sustenance and food supply were 
extremely pressing in 1946 in the Hungarian countryside, since the inadequate 
supplies, a consequence primarily of  the war acquisitions mostly by the Red 
Army in 1945, had substantially decreased agrarian production. The gap in the 
30  BFL V 56032/1, József  Vona, May 29, 1946.
31  István Birkás, Kunmadarasi jegyzetek (Dunaújváros: TACT Bt, 1995), 102;  110.
32  BFL V 56032/1, Imre Kóta, May 29, 1946.
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living standard was recognized through the comparison of  the living conditions 
of  the former war prisoners and the deported Jews.  The difference in the living 
standard that was formulated in this manner meant a real threat for the villagers: 
“they eat white bread, whereas I can hardly provide a little corn pone to my 
family, which consists of  fi ve small children.”33
For some of  the accused persons, this threat was connected with the fear 
of  an imagined Jewish revenge. One of  them remembered that Klein had given 
reasons for increasing the price of  the eggs by asserting that he would ruin all the 
retailers since he had been deported because of  the Hungarians and only as many 
Hungarians should have remained would be needed to carry the chamber pots 
for the Jews. He also claimed that the Hungarians did not know what suffering 
was, as they had been at home and were eating and drinking, and only the Jews 
knew what suffering was. These statements referred to a certain sense of  guilt, 
nevertheless only a few defendants had been motivated by personal thirst for 
revenge. They remembered when the Jews had returned from the deportations 
and demanded back their lost property: “Mrs. Weinberger, when she came back 
from the deportations and began to collect belongings that had been taken, 
falsely accused me, saying my eiderdown was hers, but it was mine.”34
Recollecting the reasons of  why they had begun to beat the Jews, the people 
of  Kunmadaras connected the pogrom with the memory of  the World War at 
the People’s Court, but in a very peculiar way. They did not remember the events 
of  the war, for example deportations or joining the army. On the contrary they 
recalled only the end of  the fi ghting, namely the return home, speaking about 
soldiers as well as Jews. The Jewish population of  Kunmadaras, which amounted 
to 273 persons at fi rst, was transported to the ghetto of  a neighboring small 
town, Karcag, that was formed on April 24, 1944. Roughly 1,300 Jews lived there 
until they were taken to the sugar factory of  the county town, Szolnok, on June 
18. A few days later they were put on trains and transported to the Third Reich. 
However, in accordance with an agreement between Edmund Veesenmayer 
(1904–1977, the Nazi deputy in Hungary) and the Hungarian authorities most 
of  them were taken to an Austrian village, Laa an der Thaya near Strasshof, 
for forced labor, and not to concentration camps. Some of  them, nevertheless, 
died in Auschwitz. A signifi cant proportion of  the deported persons returned 
home, somewhere between 70 and 120 Jews, of  whom many had survived in 
33  Ibid., Sándor Vincze, May 29, 1946.
34  Ibid., 94.
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Austrian labor camps, in the summer and autumn of  1945.35 Consequently, most 
of  the Jews who came home had no personal experiences and memories of  
death camps, and they could not give account of  such events to the villagers. 
On the other hand, those who could have spoken about the horrors of  camps 
had died in them. Thus the inhabitants of  Kunmadaras did not remember the 
deportations in the context of  a genocide that might have been perceived as 
exceptional, but rather connected them with the other type of  returning home: 
the return of  the soldiers from captivity.
Approximately 20–25 percent of  the war prisoners returned from Soviet 
and Allied captivity by the summer of  1946, but most of  the war prisoners 
came back after July, 1946, and defi nitely in 1947 for the sake of  the elections. 
The people of  Kunmadaras therefore experienced their arrival mostly after the 
pogrom, in contrast with the deported Jews, who had been already returned 
by that time. Also, 112 soldiers from Kunmadaras died during the war,36 which 
means that the catastrophe of  the Jews did not seem exceptional. Thus, the 
memory of  the former war prisoners took the form of  a sort of  a comparative 
memory, in the sense that the villagers who fought on the Eastern front as 
soldiers of  the Hungarian army always compared their living conditions to the 
living conditions of  the Jews:
[…] when the Hungarian war prisoners came home from the captivity, 
they had nothing, they had nothing to eat, the Jews returned from the 
deportations and started to buy and sell at once on the black market 
and lived well without doing any work, ate white bread, while we were 
digging in the ground [...]37
35  1941. évi népszámlálás (Budapest: Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, 1947), 548–9; Randolph L. Braham, 
The Politics of  Genocide: The Hungarian Holocaust, vol. 2 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 641, 
649; Pelle, Az utolsó, 152,  wrote about 73 Jews who had returned, but did not refer to the source of  
this detail, on the other hand the weekly Képes Figyelő (hereafter KF), May 25, 1946: 5. referred to about 
100-120 persons. The data of  the journal is probably incorrect, as a recently published survey on the 
human losses of  Kunmadaras speaks about 75 survivors. László Ötvös, Emlékezzünk régiekre, áldozatokra! 
(Kunmadaras: Önkormányzat, 1992), 20. In this regard there is no basic research that concerns the social 
and demographic consequences of  the Hungarian genocide, extending it to local communities as well, 
although recently a demographic survey has been published: Tamás Stark, Zsidóság a vészkorszakban és a 
felszabadulás után (1939–1955) (Budapest: MTA Történettudományi Intézete, 1995).
36  Tamás Stark, Hungary’s Human Losses in World War II (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 1995); Péter 
Gosztonyi, A magyar honvédség a második világháborúban (Budapest: Európa, 1992), 283–85. (First edition: 
Rome: Katolikus Szemle, 1986). Ötvös, Emlékezzünk régiekre, 7–11.
37  BFL V 56032/1, Imre Szarka, May 29, 1946.
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This phenomenon could shed light on how they remembered the war. The 
villagers never mentioned events of  the war in connection with the Jew-baiting, 
nevertheless a special linkage to the interpretation of  the war can be deciphered. 
The memory of  the villagers blurred the difference between the deportation of  
the Jews (when each member of  the community, including children, elderly and 
women as well were carried away without any reason) and service in the army, 
which concerned only the men. For them the war was a real disaster that was 
followed by starvation and privation. During the war the men were carried away 
either as soldiers or as deported Jews. When they returned home, they found 
poverty and had to begin life again, using every effort, which for them meant 
mainly hard physical work. Regarding this, it is obvious that for the villagers 
the way of  life of  the Jewish merchants who claimed that they were victims of  
the war was incomprehensible and merely confi rmed the view that the Jewish 
population did not belong to the community that was suffering the consequences 
of  the war.
This supposition is confi rmed by the text of  the decision that was accepted 
after the pogrom by an inter-party meeting of  the local parties. The main point 
of  this document was the immediate expulsion of  the Jews, however later it was 
modifi ed so that the Jews who could adapt themselves to the social change and 
the Hungarian community would be allowed to stay. Another witness explained 
this statement more subtly, namely that the people who had held the meeting 
expected the Jews to become used to democracy, that is to say, throw in their 
lot with the community. What did this common fate mean for the villagers? 
The witnesses claimed that the decision had been made against the Jews, who 
allegedly had not worked and had felt unwell in the village and had been requested 
to leave. The villagers considered hard work as the common duty in the postwar 
situation, and those who seemed to fall short of  their expectations could be 
excluded from the community.38 
The Jewish merchants were represented as people who were not bound 
to the village society, consequently sacrifi cing them meant no danger for the 
community. They could be sacrifi ced in order to preserve social peace.39 The way 
they were introduced implied that black-marketeers had no place in a working 
community: they placed themselves outside of  the society. In front of  the People’s 
Tribunal a particular social tension arose, a tension that was also understood by 
38  Ibid., 6–8, 35, 211–13, János Lippai, May 23, 1946.
39  René Girard, Violence and the Sacred (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), esp. 1–38. 
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the defendants. However, the fact that a certain layer of  the society lives better 
than others does not provide justifi cation for violent actions against them. The 
confl ict has to be represented and comprehended in a symbolic way that makes 
it inevitable that the hated group is an enemy who endangers other categories 
of  the society. 
One of  the defendants who had participated in the beating of  Rosinger at 
the military airport gave reasons why he had joined in: people coming from the 
village had told him that the Jews had collected the Christian children:
My fi ve little children, the eldest of  which is nine years old, on that 
day, namely May 21, at the same time that I heard the abovementioned 
news, was at home absolutely alone. I totally lost my mind when I 
heard this rumor, as I immediately thought that my children might 
have been in the clutches of  the Jews since then.40
Another defendant said that at fi rst he had not believed this rumor, but later, 
infl uenced by the atmosphere among the crowd, he had changed his mind. His 
sister stated that his children had been collected by certain Jews, and this drove 
the man—who certainly had joined the people beating the Jews—crazy.41
  This kind of  accusation created a moral distance between the Jews and 
the other groups of  the community of  Kunmadaras. The Jewish merchants 
were transformed into cruel child-murderers who endangered the community. 
The charge of  killing children is a very powerful one. It contrasts the principle 
of  innocence, which is embodied by the image of  the children, with the other 
side of  the moral dichotomy that is thus created, evil. On the other hand, this 
technique is a very basic mode of  distancing. Very similar accusations were 
made against the early Christians in the Roman Empire, against the Jews and 
heretics in the Middle Ages in Western Europe and later against witches. The 
historian can explore these charges in nineteenth-century East Central Europe, 
where for instance the Jews were accused of  committing ritual child murders or 
Gypsies were accused of  killing babies, or different religious sects of  depraving 
children. However, the last two forms of  accusations characteristically belonged 
to the twentieth century. Charges of  inhumanity made against a group that 
is excluded from a given community because it questions the basic norms of  
that community may sound authentic, thus the emotional distance can be easily 
40  BFL V 56032/4, Sándor Vincze, May 25, 1946.
41  BFL V 56032/1, 96–98.
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reproduced. What is more, this sort of  accusation is very powerful since if  the 
guilty person or group offends basic norms of  the community, then normally 
there is no intention of  “improving” him or her. In such cases the pattern of  the 
revenge is strengthened: the intention is to cast out the culprit.42 
According to the defendants, why did the Jews collect and kill Christian 
children? One of  the witnesses remembered when Eszter Kabai had shouted to 
the women at the market square that the Jews had killed the children and then 
boiled and eaten them. A defendant offered the following explanation for why 
he had joined the crowd: when he had worked on the fi elds he had been told 
that the Jews had carried away the Christian children. Four were found by one 
of  the Jews, while two others were found by another Jew. They were made into 
sausages and salami. Considering that the difference between the living standard 
of  certain Jewish merchants and the poorer peasants was the main cause of  the 
confl ict according to the villagers, the tale of  the Jewish merchants who were 
turning Hungarian children into sausages and salami was a perfect metaphor 
for their emotions. In a community in which there were serious shortages of  
food and a meat dish was considered almost a luxury, the abundance of  goods 
possessed by those merchants was absolutely incomprehensible and intolerable. 
Food is a very powerful form of  expression in societies that have to live in want: 
this was the situation in every traditional agricultural community, as peasant tales 
clearly show. Therefore the symbolic expression of  such welfare obviously could 
be sausages made from the meat of  Christian children. This narrative provided 
an explanation for the prosperity of  the merchants. Only a few people could 
believe the charge of  Jewish ritual murders in middle-of-the-century Hungary, 
however the tale of  cannibalism expressed demonstratively the attitude of  
the peasants towards black-marketeers. This group endangered the survival 
of  poorer families and meant social injustice for them. The black-marketeers, 
who were perceived on the basis of  differences in living standards, were given 
physical form with the help of  traditional Jewish images, and the charge of  being 
child-murderers symbolized social discontent because of  the privation and sense 
of  threat. As one of  the defendants put it, “The Jews have to be exterminated, 
let them perish, the bloody Jews since they live on Christian and Hungarian 
42  Norman Cohn, Europe’s Inner Demons (New York: Basic Books, 1975); Gábor Klaniczay, “Az 
orgiavádak nyomában,” in idem, A civilizáció peremén (Budapest: Magvető, 1990) 194–208; Tamás Kende, 
Vérvád (Budapest: Osiris, 1995). His argument in English: Tamás Kende, “The Language of  Blood Libel 
in Central and East European History,” in Pride and Prejudice, ed. László Kontler (Budapest: CEU History 
Department, 1995), 91–104.
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fl esh, they collect the Christian children and turn them into sausages, they want 
to hang the Hungarians.”43
The particularly deformed blood libel was not the cause of  the outbreak of  
the pogrom, but it served as a means of  legitimizing it. The altered charge of  
ritual murder certainly evoked aspects of  popular anti-Semitism, but in spite of  
this popular anti-Semitism cannot be regarded as the reason for the outbreak. 
Jews had often been accused of  killing children, and older people in the village 
could remember blood libels of  the nineteenth century. The charge of  ritual 
murder appeared in modern Hungary from 1882 (Tiszaeszlár) up until 1901 
(Németújvár). In Tiszaeszlár on April 1 a fourteen-year-old girl disappeared, 
and two days later in the village it was widely claimed that she had been killed 
by the Jews. It was the time of  the Jewish Easter and the election of  a new 
kosher butcher, so a great number of  Jews had come to the village. These events 
produced a tense atmosphere and the villagers connected the loss of  the girl to 
the Jews, evoking the traditional charge of  ritual murder. The Jews were accused 
of  taking the blood of  the Christian virgin in order to consecrate their temple 
or matzoh. This is the traditional language of  blood libels. Consequently, the 
tale of  the Jewish child-murderers did not sound absolutely surprising to the 
inhabitants of  Kunmadaras. People were familiar with stories of  Jewish child 
murderers. Perhaps some of  them believed these stories, but nonetheless, a 
statement made by one of  the defendants is more plausible: “Do you believe 
that the Jews kill the children?” “Yes and no.”44 
However the accusation in this case differed from the traditional blood libel 
in that it excluded any interpretation of  the reemergence of  the charge of  ritual 
murder. This case was rather a symbolically proper form of  popular accusations 
against profi teers. This conclusion is confi rmed by the fact that they assaulted 
only the merchant Jews. As Ede Kempfnek, who was a veterinary surgeon, 
43  All statements in BFL V 56032/1, 28, 31, 58–65, 65–67, 94–96, 168–69, 225–27, 264–65. On the 
symbolism of  peasant tales see: Robert Darnton, “Peasants Tell Tales: The Meaning of  Mother Goose,” in 
The Great Cat Massacre, 9–72. The perception of  governments’ inability to supply the population with the 
culturally understood minimum of  proper food was crucial in starting the revolutions of  early twentieth-
century Europe, see Belinda J. Davis, Home Fires Burning: Food, Politics, and Everyday Life in World War I 
Berlin (Chapel Hill: University of  North Carolina Press, 2000); Lars T. Lih, Bread and Authority in Russia, 
1914–1921 (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 1990); Barbara Alpern Engel, “Not By Bread Alone: 
Subsistence Riots in Russia during World War I,” Journal of  Modern History 69 (December 1997): 696–721.
44  Pelle, Az utolsó, 164. The description of  the blood libels are from Kende, Vérvád, 99–123. See also: 
Andrew Handler, Blood Libel at Tiszaeszlár (New York: Boulder, 1980); György Kövér, A tiszeszlári dráma: 
társadalomtörténeti látószögek (Budapest: Osiris, 2011).
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noted 45 years later, “When they got there somebody started saying that this 
man should not be hurt since he helped a lot when we were in trouble with the 
animals. And the people went away.”45 The participants in the riot distanced 
their neighbors by casting them in the role of  the Jewish black-marketeer during 
concrete experiences and contact.46 The memory of  the villagers preserved the 
violence as a reaction to the offenses that were taking place in the community, 
such as the arrest of  János Nagy, the illegal wealth of  the Jews, or the infl ationary 
profi teering, whereas their belief  was confi rmed by the campaign against the fl y-
pitchers and the popular aversion to Jews. 
The Penetration of  History: The Trial
The case of  Kunmadaras was tried by the Special Council of  Five of  the People’s 
Tribunal, which was formed by Act No. VII/1946 in order to pass sentence 
on persons who were accused of  committing crimes against democracy and 
the Republican system. The trial took place in Budapest in late June, 1946. All 
the major defendants were convicted of  leading a movement to overthrow the 
Republic and democracy. At fi rst sight, it may seem surprising to characterize 
violent acts against Jewish merchants as conspiracy against the system of  the 
state, nevertheless the ruling stated clearly that, “the fall of  the state order would 
be bound to happen, if  similar demonstrations were to become frequent for any 
reason.”47 How was it possible to interpret the pogrom in Kunmadaras in this 
way?
The trial was exceptionally important for the communists, so the party 
intervened in the process immediately. Originally, the communist Attorney 
General, József  Domokos considered condemning the defendants as swiftly 
as possible, so he assigned the Summary Court of  the County of  Szolnok as 
the court of  competent jurisdiction. Accordingly, the social democrat Minister 
of  Justice, István Ries, also sent the public prosecutor of  Budapest, György 
45  Ötvös, “A madarasi,” 86.
46  Distancing was one the key factors that turned “ordinary men” into cold-blooded killers in 
July 1942 in Józefow, Poland. Browning, Ordinary Men, 162. On how difference is constituted during 
interaction see: Thomas Hylland Eriksen, “The Cultural Contexts of  Ethnic Differences,” Man 
26 (March 1991): 127–144. The concept of  culture as a system of  appropriation was developed 
by Roger Chartier, “Culture As Appropriation: Popular Cultural Uses in Early Modern France,” 
in Understanding Popular Culture: Europe from the Middle Ages to the Nineteenth Century, ed. Steven L. 
Kaplan (Berlin: Mouton, 1984),  229–53. 
47  BFL V 56032/2, the sentence, 58.
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Auer, to Szolnok.48 Nevertheless, the Summary Court did not press charges 
against the people who were regarded as the main instigators, which disgusted 
the communist press. It wrote that the people, the community of  Kunmadaras, 
saw with indignation that only eight dirty, stupefi ed people in rags were sitting 
in the prisoner’s box, while the real instigators were missing. They were looking 
for János Nagy among the defendants.49 The attacks against the Summary Court 
also produced doubts regarding the competency of  the Summary Court, so 
the Attorney General passed the issue to the People’s Tribunal of  Budapest. 
However this measure had to include a modifi cation of  the charge, since the 
Summary Court had the right to sentence only common criminals, while the 
People’s Tribunal tried political cases. The indictments of  the important cases 
of  the People’s Tribunals normally were prepared in the Ministry of  Justice, 
even when these were not led by communist judges, and also every issue where 
the defendants were accused of  acting against democracy had to be passed on 
to the Ministry in order to be controlled. Under these circumstances, when the 
Attorney General found the indictment incorrect from the political point of  
view, he could modify it.50 Although the People’s Tribunals were infl uenced by 
the left, they cannot be regarded communist institutions in 1946.51 The courts 
consisted of  fi ve members: each of  them was delegated by a party of  the 
Hungarian National Front for Independence (MNFF; the Hungarian People’s 
Front).52 The two workers’ parties hoped for the nomination of  a judge who in 
their view could be trusted to represent justice.
What was this justice? Regarding the number of  defendants, there were 
59, and the judging by the echo of  the case in the international press, it was a 
gigantic trial. The greatest emphasis was placed on the fi rst three defendants. 
The fi rst defendant was Zsigmond Tóth, who had been born in Pozsony 
(Bratislava) in 1920. At the time of  the riot he was a Czechoslovak citizen, and 
together with his family he had been expelled from the country according to the 
Czechoslovak policy of  declaring people of  Hungarian nationality collectively 
48  Ákos Major, Népbíráskodás – forradalmi törvényesség (Budapest: Minerva, 1988), 279–92.
49  Tiszavidék (hereafter TV), June 6, 1946. 
50  PIL 274/11 – 64. The report of  the Attorney General, József  Domokos to Mihály Farkas, June 26, 
1946.
51  Cf. László Karsai, “The People’s Courts and Revolutionary Justice in Hungary,” in The Politics of  
Retribution in Europe: World War II and Its Aftermath, 1939–1948, ed. István Deák, Jan Gross, and Tony Judt 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 233–51. 
52  On the organization of  the Hungarian People’s Courts see Lukács Tibor, A magyar népbírósági jog és a 
népbíróságok (1945–1950) (Budapest: Zrínyi, 1979).
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war criminals. Tóth had been living in Kunmadaras for several months when the 
pogrom was broke out. The second defendant was Gergely Takács, the secretary 
of  the local organization of  the Smallholders Party. He had been born in 1899 
in Balmazújváros. Takács had lived in the village for a long time and he was one 
of  the most signifi cant members of  the community. He occupied various posts 
in the local administration in the interwar period. The third one was János Nagy, 
who had been born in Kunmadaras in 1903 and practically never left the village. 
He was embedded strongly in the life of  the community since he gained the post 
of  the local reformed teacher in 1927, became a “levente”-trainer in 1929, and 
then in 1932 a chief  trainer. In addition, he knew Gergely Takács from prewar 
times. The others were common people of  the village and actually it was these 
people who had assaulted the Jews.53
The judge had already known János Nagy, who by that time had been 
condemned of  being a fascist. So the People’s Tribunal of  Budapest generated 
certain assumptions about the identity of  the teacher according to which his past 
acts were judged. The court interpreted his initiative to gather in the building of  
the Trade Corporation and prepare a petition to be submitted to the Minister of  
Justice as an attempt to create a sympathetic crowd in support of  his case. As 
a consequence, he was seen responsible for the establishment of  an aggressive 
mass of  people, which already created an anti-Semitic atmosphere. Finally, 
Nagy’s activity was considered the defi nite cause of  further violent actions. The 
fact that he had stayed at home passively as the Jews in Kunmadaras were being 
beaten and killed was transformed into a crime: the court believed that he had 
consciously failed to prevent the villagers and especially his former disciples from 
beating the Jews, in spite of  the fact that as a teacher he had had considerable 
authority.54
As the teacher was considered the most infl uential person of  the movement, 
the other actors and the event itself  were cast in light of  his alleged identity as 
a fascist. The facts gained meaning in the narrative of  the People’s Tribunal 
according to the prescribed narrative identity of  Nagy. The trial functioned as 
a closed institution, which tried, as far as it is possible to maintain, the validity 
of  the identities that it had previously produced.55 The narrative in the ruling 
53  BFL V 56032/1, 3.
54  BFL V 56032/2, the sentence, 60.
55  Erving Goffman, Asylums (London: Penguin Books, 1968), 159–86. On the narrative see also: Róbert 
Braun, Holocaust, elbeszélés, történelem (Budapest: Osiris, 1995). A summary in English: Robert Braun, “The 
Holocaust and Problems of  Historical Representation,” History & Theory 33 (May 1994): 172–94.
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began early on May 21, 1946. Two would-be participants in the pogrom visited 
Zsigmond Tóth in his apartment. Tóth fi rst buckled on his dagger and then all 
of  them went to the market square, which was already full of  stallholders and 
buyers from the village, as well as from other parts of  the region. According to the 
ruling, the pogrom started with Tóth’s exclamation, “Well, now it’s time to start 
the dance!” He allegedly had made this statement when he became convinced 
that the atmosphere and the size of  the crowd were both appropriate. According 
to the People’s Tribunal, the villagers had realized that Tóth had called on them 
to beat, hit, and kill the Jews.56
Listing the events of  the morning, the judge stated that, “At about eleven 
o’clock in the morning the organized crowd reached József  Kohn’s house, in 
which he also has his shop.”57 Another victim tried to hide in a wagon at the 
railway station, but after a little while he was discovered and ordered to come 
out. According to the ruling, the only way in which the crowd could have found 
him was that he had been observed when in fl ight by certain people who later 
had called the others to the station. It concluded that this scene was evidence that 
the pogrom in Kunmadaras “occurred in an organized way, systematically and 
it was known and carried out by a large part of  the people.”58 Their command, 
“Come down, bloody Jew, none of  you’ll escape!”, verifi ed the statement of  
the People’s Tribunal. “After having beaten Bertalan Weisz, the crowd, which 
was systematically advancing and operating,” proceeded towards the house of  
another Jew.
If  the pogrom was an organized action of  the villagers, then consequently 
somebody had had to organize it ahead of  time. According to the ruling, the 
fi rst direct organizer of  the movement was Zsigmond Tóth, the fi rst defendant:
It could not be revealed how long had he been waiting for this 
propitious occasion, but he had been well prepared, as is shown by the 
fact that he had systematically engaged in this activity with all his might 
and competence and he had not rested until he had heated the passions 
of  the crowd to the degree that had become proper for the outbreak 
of  the subsequent events of  the day.59
56  BFL V-56032/2, on page 45–46 of  the sentence.
57  Ibid., 50.
58  Ibid., 52.
59  Ibid., 40–41.
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According to the ruling, János Nagy and Gergely Takács had been responsible 
for the violent acts, too. They knew that the mood among the people had become 
anti-Semitic, yet in spite of  this they did not do anything against it. Moreover 
they assisted in planning the pogrom. They acted consciously, according to the 
ruling, and given their intelligence they could have predicted the subsequent 
events, namely that pogrom-like actions would be taken by fascists. They were 
clear that assaulting and killing innocent Jews were fascist acts, thus they knew 
that they would commit fascist crimes.60 The court was sure that anti-Semitism 
and fascism could be equated.
The position of  the left was refl ected in a speech given by one of  their 
representatives in the parliament: “Is the government aware that the concomitant 
phenomenon of  fascism, anti-Semitism, has appeared again in certain places in 
the country? [...] What is the government ready to do in order to nip reaction, 
disguised in this way, in the bud?”61 Anti-Semitism was the litmus test of  
fascism: where it was discovered, one had to look for fascists immediately. After 
the pogroms, the Central Board (Központi Vezetőség) of  the Communist Party 
arranged a conference where the problems of  the anti-Semitic events were 
included. Moreover, the party considered the issue so important that Mátyás 
Rákosi, the secretary-general himself, also delivered a speech. He listed all the 
pogroms of  which he was aware, beginning with the Ózd case. As Rákosi noted, 
the communist secretary had been knocked down and then the anti-Semitic 
disturbances had broken out. “We have inquired into things there,” he concluded, 
“and obviously we have found fascist threads...”62 Rákosi interpreted the Miskolc 
case as a pogrom that had taken place after an anti-Semitic provocation during a 
political meeting. He contended that “many fascist people from Miskolc and the 
neighborhood had joined” the participants in the gathering. He was convinced 
that it had to be a well prepared provocation since it had paralyzed the economic 
life of  the region (no one had gone to work during the pogrom), had presented 
the Communist Party as an anti-Semitic party, and had dealt the police a heavy 
blow. He closed his speech with a supposition, namely that “a central fascist 
organization is taking part here.”63
60  V 56032/2, sentence, 59–60.
61  Vörös, “Kunmadaras,” 77.
62  Éva Standeisky, “A miskolci pogrom – ahogyan Rákosiék látták,” source publication with a preface, 
Társadalmi Szemle 45 (November 1990): 78–86.
63  Ibid.
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One of  the court’s main pieces of  evidence for that allegation that the 
villagers organized a pogrom was the fact that a meeting had taken place after 
the unsuccessful excursion to Nagy’s trial. The ruling interpreted the events as 
follows: when the villagers found themselves unable to enter the court, they 
returned home and decided to gather in the building of  the Trade Corporation 
(Ipartestület) of  Kunmadaras to write a petition on Nagy‘s behalf  to the Minister 
of  Justice. The fact that the crowd returned home after they were not allowed 
to enter the courtroom convinced the chairman that their basic purpose had 
been to repeat their previous “terror action.” According to him, the people of  
Kunmadaras had gone back because they had realized that there was no chance 
of  achieving their goal to liberate the teacher by coercing the court. The fact that 
every witness confessed that they had signed the form also spoke against them. 
The atmosphere of  the meeting had been characterized by the hatred against the 
People‘s Tribunal, the police and the Jews, stated the judge. That was the point 
where the results of  the activity of  the three major defendants were merged into 
each other, since each of  them was present in the building that evening. Gergely 
Takács then actively incited against the Jews. He learned from a participant that 
someone had rung the police in Karcag to prevent the crowd from entering. He 
immediately claimed that this had surely been done by the Jews. The People‘s 
Tribunal argued that the defendants had consciously exploited the people’s 
anger, which had been infl amed partly by them against the People’s Tribunal and 
the police, and had contributed to the creation of  an anti-Semitic atmosphere by 
making infl ammatory statements.64
They knew that the villagers were angry with the witnesses for the 
prosecution, consequently Takács suggested forcing them to withdraw their 
testimony. Thus the crowd waited for Ferenc Takács, one of  the witnesses for 
the prosecution, near the cemetery, where they started to pelt the witness, who 
was returning home on a cart, with stones. By that time they had been persuaded, 
however, that the Jews had obstructed the trial, which was shown clearly by the 
curses they uttered at Ferenc Takács and his wife: “Wait till we catch you, bloody 
democrats, henchmen of  the Jew People’s Tribunal, Jewish henchmen, there 
will be no trial now!”65A few villagers started to identify the witnesses for the 
prosecution with the Jews and to imagine a Jewish conspiracy behind the events. 
They had decided, according to the ruling, that in spite of  any alleged plans of  
64  BFL V 56032/2, sentence,  42.
65  Ibid., 43.
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the Jews, they would defend the teacher. Another group of  villagers went to the 
house of  the second witness for the prosecution, Ferenc Wurczel, and forced 
him to go with them to the building of  the Trade Corporation. However, in the 
street he was attacked by the crowd and badly beaten. According to the ruling, 
he was assaulted primarily because of  his Jewish origins.66
What thoroughly convinced the People’s Tribunal that the case had been an 
anti-Semitic conspiracy was that Zsigmond Tóth had stated that he had learned 
that the Jews would try to carry off  János Nagy from his house at night, so he 
had decided to watch. He also called on people to harass the Jews the next day.67 
The ruling interpreted the antecedents of  the pogrom as part of  an organized 
conspiracy that had been prepared by three anti-Semitic people to achieve, fi rstly, 
the release of  one of  them from police custody together with the humiliation 
of  the People’s Tribunal, secondly, the organization of  a pogrom. The ruling 
considered Tóth’s anti-Semitic activity and Nagy and Takács’s movement against 
the People’s Tribunal as connected. When Zsigmond Tóth incited the people 
against the Jews, Gergely Takács joined in the activity, claiming that “it’s time to 
get rid of  those who sponge off  the Hungarian people.”68The ruling managed to 
fi nd an anti-Semitic conspiracy that fi nally had resulted in a pogrom.
Nevertheless, according to the People’s Tribunal the main purpose of  the 
conspiracy was not to plan violence against the Jews. Parallel to the organization 
of  the anti-Semitic pogrom another movement took place in Kunmadaras 
at approximately the same time. The teacher in the village, János Nagy, was 
sentenced as a war criminal in 1945. However, due to the legal incompetence of  
the fi rst court, a second trial was planned to be held in Karcag on May 20, 1946. 
In order to be acquitted he started a movement among his former disciples in the 
“levente”-organization, as the People’s Tribunal argued.69 The ruling interpreted 
the incident when the police prevented the villagers from entering the location 
of  Nagy’s trial as an attack against the authority and honor of  the police and the 
People’s Tribunal, since it had happened publicly. The judge concluded that Nagy 
and his friend Takács had acted consciously and maliciously against the People’s 
Tribunal in order to prevent Nagy’s conviction. They also had involved Nagy’s 
wife in the movement by persuading her to go to the Hungarian Democratic 
66  Ibid., 44; 59.
67  Ibid., 44–45.
68  Ibid., 41.
69  Ibid., 40.
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Women’s Association (MNDSZ), where she “asked them, in tears, to save her 
husband from the clutches of  the People’s Tribunal.”70 
The sentence claimed that Nagy and Takács had led a movement against the 
democratic system when they had prevented the police and the People’s Tribunal 
from fulfi lling their obligations. They created a mass action, the judge argued, 
that prevented the police from leading the defendant into the courtroom, and 
this had paralyzed the power of  the police. Furthermore, they had compelled the 
People’s Tribunal, with the help of  the crowd that had been mobilized by them, 
not to pass sentence on a criminal (Nagy). That it became known among a couple 
of  thousand people that the force of  the masses was capable of  obstructing 
the work of  constitutional institutions and even paralyzing the functioning of  
the democratic system was the antidemocratic factor in the aforementioned 
defendants’ action.71 The sentence stressed that the security of  the democracy 
had been seriously threatened.
What or who threatened democracy? In its understanding of  the events the 
People’s Tribunal described the incident when the villagers had returned home 
together with their teacher, characterizing them all as fascists who were enemies 
of  the democratic order and who had obstructed the People’s Tribunal and the 
police, preventing them from fulfi lling their obligations. The ruling offered the 
following evidence: they had also known that the fascists had been enemies 
of  the contemporary system and had been aspiring to overthrow it. Therefore, 
concluded the People’s Tribunal, when they had obstructed the police and the 
People’s Tribunal, they had committed fascist crimes. In the following part 
the ruling proved that everyone had known that acting against the law meant 
attacking the state. After the pogrom the representatives of  the local parties 
gathered and issued a declaration that said that the Jews of  the village and Ferenc 
Takács, the most important witness for the prosecution, would have to leave 
the village. The People’s Tribunal comprehended this scene as a real fascist act 
against democracy, since it had alloyed anti-Semitic elements with an attack 
against a person “who is really faithful to the ideas of  the people’s democracy.”72
This manner of  reasoning endowed anti-Semitism with a new function. It 
ceased to refer to the crime of  which the defendants had been accused. Instead 
it became an indicator of  fascism. Accordingly, the chairman interpreted the 
decision of  the inter-party meeting about the fact that the Jews and Ferenc 
70  Ibid., 37.
71  Ibid., 58.
72  Ibid., 56.
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Takács had had to leave the village as a typical manifestation of  fascist terror. The 
concomitant phenomenon of  every fascist action inevitably was anti-Semitism, 
as implied by the following statement:
As a natural, obvious outcome, and necessary accessories of  the fascist, 
anti-state character of  the whole movement, an act that was originally 
directed solely against the power of  the state, the People’s Tribunal, the 
state institutions that had ordered the arrest, turned against the Jews 
through the guidance of  Zsigmond Tóth and Gergely Takács.73
According to this logic, fascists always organize anti-Semitic pogroms and 
anti-Semitic pogroms are always committed by fascists. The People’s Tribunal 
equated fascism with anti-Semitism and vice versa. This argumentation meant 
doubtlessly that any anti-Jewish act was directed against the democratic system. 
According to this understanding, the Chairman of  the Court argued that the 
events of  Kunmadaras were not a Jewish issue, but rather an issue pertaining to 
the whole Hungarian state order.74 These statements disconnected anti-Semitism 
from the Jews. Although beating and killing Jews (or any other group) is obviously 
at the least an anti-democratic act, the sentence referred to this act only to prove 
the appearance of  fascism. In a strange way, the events were recaptured without 
the presence of  the Jews. The People’s Tribunal managed to produce a narrative 
of  an anti-Semitic pogrom without involving the Jewish victims.
What was very characteristic of  the case is that even the Jewish victims 
contributed to this reconstruction. While they recollected memories of  their 
sufferings they connected these events with another atrocity that had taken place 
in the village. For them, this provided a logical explanation of  the pogrom, not 
least of  all because they could fi nd people responsible for it. The victims who 
had experienced deportations, offi cial anti-Semitic discourse and Nazi and Arrow 
Cross cruelty against Jews interpreted the harassment of  Jews in Kunmadaras 
in the same framework. For them it had been an anti-Semitic pogrom that had 
been organized by fascist war criminals and carried out by a cruel crowd. A 
victim said that he knew János Nagy as a “levente”-trainer with a Sam Browne 
belt who taught his disciples to sing anti-Semitic songs. Another one recognized 
one of  the defendants as a chief  “levente” whom she knew as a great fascist. 
73  BFL V 56032/1, the dissent of  the chairman of  the Court.
74  Ibid.
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One of  the victims claimed that people who had hit them had also served in the 
Hungarian SS armored division.75
The occurrences evoked memories of  the deportations in the witnesses. 
One of  them recollected that one of  the defendants had accompanied them to 
the village with the following words: ”Well, Jews I have come for you, go to the 
others who are already lying in a heap.” This was represented also symbolically. 
According to some of  them, the villagers had been led by a person dressed 
in black or brown with a little moustache. Furthermore, for them the tale of  
infanticides was remembered in the form of  a charge of  ritual murder. A few of  
them recollected that the villagers had been asserting that the Jews had collected 
the Christian children, as they had needed blood to consecrate temples.76 
While the Jewish victims were looking for the people responsible for the 
violence and the reasons underlying their acts, the explanation of  the People’s 
Tribunal was plausible for them. The statement that the pogrom was not only 
a Jewish issue but rather an issue pertaining to the new democracy meant for 
them that anti-Semitism was considered a crime against the state that called for 
serious punishment. It seemed that the authorities took the issue of  Jew-baiting 
seriously, and this created a feeling of  security. In addition the deportations 
were not an exceptionally important element in Jewish memory in this trial. 
The memory of  the deportations was not formulated exclusively in the Jewish 
context. The victims remembered it in connection with other events, but the 
memory served symbolically to represent suffering. Their suffering, however, 
was not given greater signifi cance than the sufferings of  anyone else. As the 
chief  rabbi of  Kecskemét argued, there was no need to mourn for the Jews who 
had been killed innocently, but rather for human civilization, which had fallen, 
and the classes that had been  responsible for this had persecuted not only the 
Jewry but the exploited poor as well.77 If  anti-Semitism was considered an act 
against the democratic state, then it was possible to be an anti-Fascist without 
being a Jew. Jewishness could be solved within the identity of  a person who was 
on the side of  democracy and the oppressed.
Rulings in a trial are, however, not simple statements. They are not simply 
one among many publicly manifested opinions that can be freely contested. If  
rulings are brought in formally adequate conditions, they have legally binding 
consequences. A legally correct ruling is a performative speech act that impacts 
75  BFL V 56032/1. 277–80, 301–03, 333.
76  BFL V 56032/1, 4.
77  TV, July 3, 1947: 2.
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social reality in very concrete ways. It makes (and often compels) individuals, 
institutions and authorities act and speak in certain ways, obliges them to commit 
certain actions and to address issues in a particular manner.78 The manner in 
which the People’s Tribunal equated Fascism and anti-Semitism had important 
consequences on how institutions and public fi gures started to think and speak 
about the state and the concept of  democracy. In a situation in which the notion 
of  democracy required an absolutely new form of  public discourse that was 
based primarily on the sense of  being threatened, fascism was produced as the 
enemy of  the democracy, which made it possible to identify democracy with the 
struggle against fascism. Fascism and democracy were presented together, and 
fascist movements were needed in order to constitute the endangered democracy. 
In the thirteenth century the Eucharist started to occupy a central position in 
Christian ceremonies. The Eucharist was represented as potent and capable of  
working miracles. The Eucharist was considered a sacrament that was able to 
defend itself  from its enemies. The Jews, who were obviously not Christians 
(and offi cial Church discourse often referred to them as murderers of  Christ), 
were involved in that process. A new narrative emerged about Jewish abuse 
and desecration of  the holy host that usually ended with a miracle ensuring the 
safety of  the Eucharist. However, these accusations were not merely intended 
to “point out” that the Jews were enemies of  Christianity, but rather to provide 
evidence of  the threats to the host and, consequently, its miraculous power. 
The Jews played a crucial rhetorical role in producing the qualities and existence 
of  the Eucharist, and furthermore their existence as a (fabricated) threat was a 
fundamental requirement of  the foundation of  that entity.79
Something very similar happened in the case of  the notion of  democracy in 
Hungary after World War II. The National Assembly accepted in March, 1946 Act 
VII, which was about the protection of  the democratic system and the republic 
and contained defi nitions of  several political crimes. In a situation in which the 
democracy in Hungary defi ned itself  as young and therefore defenseless and 
fascism had proven a danger to democracy during the war, the representatives of  
the Assembly considered penal protection as an effective and necessary measure 
against opponents of  this system. As the act explained it, 
78  John L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962).
79  Miri Rubin, “The Making of  the Host Desecration Accusation: Persuasive Narratives, Persistent 
Doubts,” in Proof  and Persuasion. Essays on Authority, Objectivity, and Evidence, ed. Suzanne Marchand and 
Elizabeth Lunbeck (Turnhout: Brepols, 2001), 100–23.
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The penal defense of  the state order is an obligation of  the fi rst order 
for every country, a system based on democratic principles cannot lack 
an effective penal state defense. But least of  all a state like Hungary, 
which is rising again after World War II and the Arrow Cross–German 
devastation. Our democratic system can look back on only one year of  
development, while the republican form of  state has been realized only 
recently. Regarding these conditions, the attacks against the democratic 
Hungarian system and form of  state are of  even greater account, since 
they endanger substantially the existence of  the state, the development 
of  the life of  the society and, together with them, the place of  the 
Hungarian people among the democratic nations.80
Therefore the Act considered every attack aiming at the overthrow of  
the democratic system and the republican form of  the state to merit serious 
punishment. The explanation indicated the purpose of  the act as the prevention 
of  any recurrence of  fascist-like anti-state aspirations. The trial of  the pogrom 
in Kunmadaras was the fi rst case that was tried on the basis of  this Act.
Fascism is defi nitely inimical to democracy. The People’s Tribunal also 
shared this view. Fascist acts were obviously capable of  overthrowing any 
kind of  democratic system, as the ruling emphasized. It argued essentially that 
inherent characteristics showed the real nature of  particular acts. Accordingly, 
the conclusion was drawn that fascist deeds and movements naturally opposed 
the notion of  democracy. They were incapable of  living together and fascism 
could prevail only after the death of  democracy. Consequently it aspired to 
destroy democratic order.81 Fascism and democracy were old enemies, so 
protecting fascist activity endangered the Hungarian republic, as had happened 
in Germany, when the Weimar Republic had been overthrown by Hitler’s fascists 
(so argued the chairman of  the Court). It was therefore seen as logical for the 
People’s Tribunal to interpret the events in Kunmadaras as simply signs of  a 
reemergence of  fascism. The ruling stated that Gergely Takács had been the 
election agent of  an Arrow Cross member of  the parliament, and later had 
been named sergeant by Ferenc Szálasi, the leader of  the fascist Arrow Cross 
Party, during the last days of  the war in Germany. János Nagy had allegedly 
mobilized his disciples, who had been educated in the spirit of  fascism by him. 
Not only had old fascists reappeared, but the whole village had gone back to the 
age of  fascism, to 1944. According to the chairman of  the Court, the case of  
80  1946. évi törvénycikkek (Budapest: Franklin Társulat, 1946), 19–20.
81  BFL V 56032/2, sentence, 59–60.
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Rosinger, who had been killed, clearly proved the total victory of  the prevailing 
ideas of  1944. The chairman evoked another scene: “Ernő Weinberger’s family 
is lying bloody in the ditch and the crowd is carrying off  the lard, bacon, and 
goods in stock. The atmosphere of  1944 is complete.”82 He characterized the 
decision of  the inter-party meeting as a fascist act by claiming that the fall of  
order in Kunmadaras had become absolute. Only the wagons necessary in order 
to deport the persecuted had been missing. According to these statements, in 
Kunmadaras fascists had reenacted their role by attacking Hungarian democracy.
A historical trial makes history internal, in other words it personalizes it. The 
goal is to transform the historical narrative into personal experiences. The trial is 
a drama in which social reality is constituted, reproduced and reenacted.83 In the 
fi rst trial of  Nagy the sentence evoked history: the defendant was connected to 
the fascists of  World War II. A similar technique can be detected in the trial of  
the pogrom in Kunmadaras. 
A freak smile could show on the face of  the organizers and leaders 
of  the movement, what they had wanted was realized: the village of  
Kunmadaras had gone back on the cart of  time to the fascist and 
Arrow Cross era of  the year 1944, some of  its inhabitants acted as the 
fascist and Arrow Cross scoundrels of  that time had acted.84 
The process established historical continuity between Nazism and the 
anti-Jewish riot of  Kunmadaras in order to show the continuity of  fascism. 
However, through this representation, the enemies of  postwar fascism could 
present themselves as the heirs to an anti-Fascist past or speak about their past 
as the anti-Fascist past. As fascism is against democratic systems, the adversaries 
of  fascism could present themselves as perpetual defenders of  democracy. Thus 
the emergence of  the new democratic state of  Hungary could be explained 
not as the consequence of  the collapse of  the prewar regime, but as part of  
a constant anti-Fascist struggle. Consequently, only people who could prove 
their anti-Fascist pasts could present themselves as propagators of  the new 
democracy, and at the same time this became suffi cient evidence that someone 
had a democratic mentality. 
82  BFL V 56032/1, the dissent of  the chairman of  the court.
83  Robert Hariman, ed., Popular Trials (London–Tuscaloosa: University of  Alabama Press, 1990), 1–16; 
James E. Young, The Texture of  Memory (New Haven–London: Yale University Press, 1993), 11–15; Steven 
Knapp, “Collective Memory and the Actual Past,” Representations 26 (Spring 1989): 123–49.
84  BFL V 56032/2, sentence, 46.
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The dissent of  the chairman stated that after the crowd had returned 
home, Kunmadaras had experienced a fascist-like terror and the state authority 
basically had fallen due to this terror.85 This interpretation added a new aspect 
to the concept of  democracy, which started to mean the institutions and the 
structure of  the state. From this time on, the security of  democracy meant 
defending the authority of  the state. From the point of  view of  the birth of  the 
Hungarian people’s democracy, the aspiration of  the post-World War II system 
to fi nd fascist conspirators, who allegedly represented the greatest threat to it, 
can be considered crucial. During this endeavor the regime itself  produced the 
fascists. The People’s Tribunal defi ned the anti-Jewish riot in Kunmadaras as 
a fascist conspiracy. This statement identifi ed fascism with anti-Semitism and 
provided a tool with which the authorities could fi nd their enemies: from this 
time on the appearance of  anti-Semitism made fascist conspiracies immediately 
recognizable. This logical connection made it possible for the system, which 
defi ned itself  as a young democracy threatened by fascism, to demonstrate a 
historical continuity of  fascism, and this presented the regime as the authentic 
heir to the anti-Fascist struggle. Finally, the state authority, which was taking 
measures against fascism, was able to conceive of  itself  as democracy.
Conclusions
Various Communist versions of  the anti-Fascist myth played an immense role 
in the shaping of  the Stalinist dictatorships in postwar East Central Europe. 
In this narrative, fascism was simplifi ed as the brutal attempt of  reactionary 
capitalist classes to maintain their rule over the working masses and to suppress 
the democratic aspirations of  the people. Communists claimed themselves the 
representatives of  the people, thus, initiating and leading the resistance against 
Fascism. The protection of  democracy, thus, equaled Communism, whereas 
any attack or criticism of  this (Communist) “democracy” was understood as 
Fascism. In this particular narrative, the fascist assault against democracy 
necessarily targeted Communists, and Communists were the only people who 
really resisted Fascism. The victims of  Fascism suffered for political reasons. The 
Jews were at best marginal components of  the story or were rather completely 
ignored. Despite the blatant simplifi cations and manipulations in this narrative, 
this strange post-Fascist anti-Fascism could link itself  to tangible experiences of  
85  BFL V 56032/1, the dissent of  the chairman of  the court.
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political resistance, as in Germany, or nationwide anti-German armed resistance, 
as in Yugoslavia or Poland.86 In Hungary, which remained unfortunately Hitler’s 
last, if  only reluctant, ally, on the contrary, there had been only sporadic domestic 
resistance. The Hungarian version of  the anti-Fascist myth, it seems, instead of  
the wartime semi-fi ction of  Communist anti-Fascist resistance was based on the 
postwar fi ction of  anti-Communist Fascism.
As they abused the Jewish victims only to establish a clearly and 
immediately recognizable characteristic of  “Fascism”, these strange anti-Fascist 
ideologies took for granted the existence of  “Jews” as an ethnic category. As 
a consequence, such ideologies were never interested in the actual social and 
cultural circumstances that helped to sustain the particularism and exclusion 
of  Jewish citizens and the ethnicization of  such mechanisms. In Kunmadaras, 
however, cultural stereotypes were mobilized and political messages were 
appropriated and fi nally were translated into ethnic categories during actual social 
intercourse in the marketplace on  May 21, 1946.87 Peasant or local communities 
actually distanced their neighbors as “Jews” to be beaten through their everyday 
interactions, which helped to construct ethnicity and ethnic identities in a village 
that, as an outcome, was split between “Hungarians” and “Jews” in the Summer 
of  1946.
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